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Abstract: Philosophers of technology are not playing the public role that our own the-
oretical perspectives motivate us to take. A great variety of theories and perspectives 
within philosophy of technology, including those of Marcuse, Feenberg, Borgmann, 
Ihde, Michelfelder, Bush, Winner, Latour, and Verbeek, either support or directly call 
for various sorts of intervention—a call that we have failed to heed adequately. Bar-
riers to such intervention are discussed, and three proposals for reform are advanced: 
(1) post-publication peer-reviewed reprinting of public philosophy, (2) increased em-
phasis on true open access publication, and (3) increased efforts to publicize and adapt 
traditional academic research.
Key words: Public philosophy, philosophy of technology, scholarly intervention, ac-
tivist scholarship, activist-scholar, scholarship of engagement, peer-review, tenure and 
promotion, impact assessment.
Introduction
The public stature of philosophy in the United States has been in unnecessary de-
cline. To be sure, some bioethicists, notably Peter Singer and Arthur Caplan, con-
tribute so regularly to newspapers and magazines that they have become household 
names. These rare public intellectuals remind us that philosophical ideas can reso-
nate widely when expressed in the right way and given the right forum. Under pres-
ent circumstances, however, their contributions to public life are utterly exceptional.
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When journalists seek a source to comment on the meaning of scientific and 
technological development, they often turn to scientists and technologists, rather 
than philosophers of science and technology whose area of study is more central 
to the journalist’s concern. When writers and editors seek commentators on nor-
mative policy matters, philosophers are rarely their top choice. Instead, prefer-
ence tends to be directed at psychologists, sociologists, economists, and political 
scientists—academics who typically are not trained to directly and authoritatively 
address fundamental issues of morality and justice. And, when public discourse 
turns towards existential dilemmas, representatives of religious groups (or, more 
rarely, activist atheists) tend to be the dominant voices.
From the cloistered confines of the university, keeping the discipline insular 
can seem like a good thing. First of all, philosophy is a deep and rigorous exer-
cise. To convey the requisite nuance, refined logic and language is required. By 
contrast, journalistic prose can appear more suited for cheap rhetorical appeals to 
emotion. Secondly, in a time when search engine optimization has an extensive 
reach, the language of journalism can seem overly contrived and hyperbolic—
crafted more to meet the advertising imperative of bringing eyeballs to a page 
and generating social media recommendations peppered with intellectually sugary 
memes than conveying complex and sometime counter-intuitive truths. Thirdly, 
philosophical arguments tend to develop slowly, over prolonged periods of time. 
They are stretched across a vast communal tapestry of articles and carefully edited 
volumes. The speed of journalism, by contrast, is fast—conveying rapid, real-time 
responses—and less oriented to emphasizing citational chains.
While the insular outlook can make philosophy seem special—an untimely 
endeavor that is immune to contingent social pressures—it is increasingly out of 
sync with the practical pressures today’s university administrators face. These 
pressures make it increasingly hard to justify hiring faculty from disciplines that 
are not perceived to add value to vocational training or global citizenship. In fact, 
these pressures also justify cutting faculty lines, including entire departments. The 
longer philosophers are perceived to be an esoteric community with their backs 
turned away from social engagement, the easier we make it to lose the very aca-
demic protections that keep the profession alive.
Beyond these bureaucratic challenges, philosophers need to do a better job 
of connecting with faculty from other disciplines. Due to the complexity of so 
many pressing social problems, multi- and interdisciplinary research is increas-
ingly becoming identified as a key driver of innovation. Unfortunately, potential 
colleagues don’t ask us to be collaborators because they don’t know what our 
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research entails. Thanks in part to the perception that what we do is not accessible 
to non-philosophers, they suspect that even if they were clued in to our work, it 
would be too esoteric to be relevant.
Finally, there are the students to consider. Many of us regularly teach courses 
to students from across the disciplines who primarily take our classes because of 
the general education credit they offer. They come to our lectures and discussions 
with low expectations, assuming that we cater curricula to philosophy majors, 
treating everyone else as if they have value only when behaving as if they were 
philosophers in training. It is a good bet that we would get more buy-in from them 
if they perceived that we also wrote for them—that we considered them a valuable 
target audience and not mere rabble to be tolerated as a means of justifying our 
employment vis-à-vis being accreditation gatekeepers.
A related point is if philosophical arguments circulated more widely, new-
found readers from related disciplines and professions might be willing to give 
guest-lectures over media like Skype. Although we can only give anecdotal tes-
timony, personal experience suggests that these virtual visitors can boost morale 
significantly. When students see experts from outside of philosophy willingly 
donate their time to advance philosophical education, they often become more 
amenable to believing that philosophical analysis adds value to other fields.
Critics might argue that even if it is strategically valuable for philosophers 
to become more socially engaged, the hurdles are too vast to overcome. Echoing 
the derision that Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2002) associated with 
the “culture industry,” they might say American culture is so bound up with facile 
consumerism in that it is not amenable to more philosophical engagement.
This attribution of blame is overly simplistic, and we squarely reject both 
its armchair sociology and predictive adequacy. Certainly, aspects of our culture 
exhibit widespread anti-intellectual or anti-philosophical bias. Others, however, 
are philosophically rich, even including many popular films, books, and television 
shows. Ultimately, the broad analytic category of ‘culture’ is insufficiently refined 
to bear the causal weight of substantive normative assessment. Far from being 
dominated by a core sensibility that reiterates monolithic values throughout all 
cultural forms, the ongoing American experiment gets expressed in diverse high- 
and lowbrow ways.
The same point can be extended to the culture of journalism. While some 
magazines, newspapers, and blogs are constrained by the limits identified above, 
others are not. Some editors are cultivating a readership that is dissatisfied with 
status quo reporting and editorializing.
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Crucially, though, placing the blame on an external source is an exercise in bad 
faith. By narrating academic philosophers as victims of other people’s banal sensi-
bilities, we get to avoid confronting the troubling question of how we’ve contributed 
to this sad state of affairs—how we’ve fallen far short of living up to our potential. 
To examine this shortfall critically, we need to take a systems approach and ask how 
putative matters of personal choice (e.g, who we prefer to write for) are shaped by 
academic incentive structures—structures that exert disciplinary power by being 
configured to normalize certain behaviors while rendering others undesirable.
Succinctly put, the behaviors that disciplinary norms reward—tenure, pro-
motion, and stature for contributing to top-tier philosophical journals, specialized 
conferences, and highly technical books—favor the self-enforced sequestration of 
philosophers from public discourse on philosophical issues. Within this context, 
effort spent on communicating with the public is seen in negative terms; it detracts 
from the time-intensive endeavors that the profession legitimates. Public outreach, 
then, becomes an opportunity cost or else is relegated to a hobby—a fun thing to do, 
if, against the odds, you’ve got spare time on your hands. And since philosophers 
typically are not required to do sponsored research, they are not subject to expecta-
tions like the ones imposed by the National Science Foundation’s second criterion: 
considering broader impacts as a prerequisite for establishing a research plan.
Philosophers of technology are well suited to play an important role in re-
versing this ultimately self-defeating trend. Along with some other specialties 
within philosophy—biomedical, business, and computer ethics, for example—our 
research often addresses applied issues that are of direct public concern. And, 
perhaps most importantly, a widespread conviction exists in our field that values-
based discussion should be taking place across professional and public sectors 
about the ethical implications of technological design and adoption. With two 
profound forces aligning—a natural fit based in subject matter and theoretically-
based motivation—the time has come to capitalize on their synergy.
Theoretically-based Motivations for Intervention in Public Dialogue
Numerous philosophers of technology, from various traditions within the field, 
have put forth positions that justify intervening in public debate about the meaning, 
reception, and adaptation of new and emerging science and technology (NEST). 
Let’s consider some of the classical and more contemporary views.
Herbert Marcuse (1964) called for a “great refusal” to interrupt the steady 
uncritical adoption of technology into ever more aspects of our lives—a social 
action which would require a change in the perception of technological develop-
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ment as both desirable and inevitable. Without this liberatory aim, he worried that 
people would increasingly act less like deliberative citizens and more like one-
dimensional, passive consumers.
Andrew Feenberg (e.g., 1991, 1999) builds upon Marcuse’s work to put forth 
an idea of the democratization of technological progression and adoption through 
public involvement in critical discourse. Feenberg argues that not only is such 
democratization possible, but that it is crucial to avoid the trappings of technoc-
racy—an ideology that subordinates value-driven politics, which are the messy 
frictions that lie at the heart of a vibrant democracy, to ill-fated social engineering, 
i.e, the hubristic attempts to solve complex social problems through technological 
fixes and efficiency-driven policy. These concerns, furthermore, are even present 
within the debate already taking place—it is not that the issues are not live ones 
within the public sphere, but that philosophers have failed to play a prominent role 
within their discussion.
This Critical Theory outlook clearly calls for the philosopher of technology 
to go beyond abstract theorization in closed academic spheres, and to move into 
engagement with and intervention in public discourse and debate. Although Mar-
cuse made his case over half a century ago, the profession has not done a good job 
responding to the vocational summons.
Albert Borgmann (1984) discusses the dangers accompanying the reception 
and use of technology under the “device paradigm”—an eclipse of virtuous char-
acter, and, therein, the capacity to live a meaningful existence, one filled with 
intellectual and physical challenges that instill pride, and memorable social oc-
casions that build solidarity and cultivate grace and gratitude. His preferred solu-
tion, “focal practices,” is exemplified by the testimony of ordinary people who 
acknowledge the transformative power of their life-affirming activities. The more 
attestations of focal practices that are given, the greater the chance that their eman-
cipatory message can be heard and guide social transformation.
Those of us who find wisdom and insight in Borgmann’s post-Heideggerian 
analysis should be well motivated to support the numerous non-academics who 
keenly feel the loss of center and meaning that he identifies and theorizes. Sadly, 
this discussion is already taking place without us. Too often it takes the insuffi-
ciently critical form of Neo-Luddite laments and attacks upon the youth—attacks 
that either close off understanding and dialogue, or, through their intellectual pov-
erty, add fuel to the fire of techno-utopianism. Even those with libertarian leanings 
can concede that there is room for and interest in, discussing “family values” and 
the good life, and that society is better off when the discussions do not degrade 
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into reactionary rejections of change, or the false solutions proffered by “simpler 
living” magazines and endlessly proliferating faddish child-rearing manuals.
Don Ihde (1998) argues that the key to doing pragmatic technological ethics 
is to engage technical research as it begins, during the research and development 
phase. The earlier one intervenes, the more opportunity there is to engage in an-
ticipatory design—design that expresses sensitivity to the potential for innovation 
to be socially disruptive. As time progresses, users can develop deeply entrenched 
habits that are hard to break. Moreover, if technological lock-in occurs, it can 
become cost-prohibitive to make fundamental changes. In some cases, perceptions 
of economic necessity can end up crowding out ethical considerations—consid-
erations that appear impractical and overly idealistic. Consider the prominent role 
in businesses played by organizational psychologists, and the role played by tech-
nocratic policy experts in design standards and regulation. If we agree with Ihde’s 
perspective, shouldn’t we seek to gain access to these backrooms and boardrooms?
Diane Michelfelder (2000) and Corlann Gee Bush (1983) have made paral-
lel and reinforcing arguments from feminist philosophy of technology, critically 
extending these points in important ways. In Michelfelder’s case, supporting inter-
ventions similar to Borgmann’s over those of Feenberg, we see how giving proper 
weight to women’s experiences provides an understanding of the role of technol-
ogy in building relationships and a meaningful life that is all too easy to fail to 
notice without adopting a feminist perspective.
Bush’s proposal for reformist intervention, like those of Feenberg and Ihde, 
falls more on the design than the adoption side. She points out that it is men who 
predominantly control technology in the design and development contexts, leav-
ing women in a receptive and adaptive role, tasked with integrating technological 
changes into the everyday conduct of life, bearing the burden of maintaining indi-
vidual, family, and cultural values in the face of a shifting landscape designed with 
too little thought to women’s lives and experience. From this position, she proposes 
the idea of gender equity analyses, similar to environmental impact assessments 
now commonly carried out. In either case—whether on the design or adoption end 
of technological innovation—it is a sad but apparent fact that women’s experience 
continues to be marginalized. Philosophers who recognize the importance of this 
issue and its effects may wish to bring feminist insights beyond the cloistered 
realm of academic discourse and into either the public sphere or the still all-too-
male-dominated design context. Arguably, they might even be obligated to.
Langdon Winner’s work on the political meaning of technology (e.g., 1989) 
provides another basis upon which we may be impelled to change public dialogue 
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to bring awareness to structures of oppression and discrimination within techno-
logical forms—forms that might otherwise be viewed as simple technological facts 
immune from public debate and scrutiny. Whether we speak of inherently political 
technologies, or those that take on political meanings in their implementation and 
realization, such analysis reaches far beyond racist bridges and nuclear reactors.
In an evocative but hardly isolated case, HP Computers recently produced 
a facial-recognition system that was called “racist” for its inability to recognize 
persons with dark skin tones (Simon 2009). In a blog post that’s no longer online, 
an HP employee explained that, “The technology we use is built on standard al-
gorithms that measure the difference in intensity of contrast between the eyes and 
the upper cheek and nose. We believe that the camera might have difficulty see-
ing contrast in conditions where there is insufficient foreground lighting” (Welch 
2009). Such remarks appear woefully ignorant of the long and problematic history 
of issues of race in photographic image capture, including Kodak’s failure to cali-
brate for dark skin tones until the mid-1990s1 and Jean-Luc Godard’s 1979 refusal 
to use Kodak’s film, which he called “racist” (Smith 2013).
It is clear enough that even when there is presumably no racist intent, and a 
clear technical reason and market incentive to notice and accommodate racial dif-
ferences, there are sometimes stunning failures to recognize that objects can have 
political meanings and impacts. Related concerns should be on the philosopher of 
technology’s radar, too. Looking forward, for example, augmented reality raises 
the possibility of altering how racial minorities are perceived (Selinger 2012a). 
This means of exacerbating the filter bubble surely can be bolstered by other tech-
nological advances as well, which is why philosophers need constantly to chal-
lenge the conceptual biases that enable such “race blindness” to occur.
Bruno Latour’s actor-network-theory (1999) notions of ‘translation’ and 
‘delegation’ of intentionality also provide useful insight into how to think about 
the content and meaning of technical objects, especially when trying to understand 
and appropriately make choices related to technologically mediated actions and 
technology policies. As Evan Selinger argued in his general-audience article, “The 
Philosophy of Technology of the Gun” (2012b), Latour’s theory can help us cut 
through heated, special interest fueled rhetoric. The wide scope of responses to 
this article, in blogs, on Twitter, and on MSNBC, shows that even abstract and 
counter-intuitive theories like Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT) and his prin-
ciple of symmetry can be presented to non-academic audiences in productive, ap-
pealing, and potentially influential ways.
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Peter-Paul Verbeek (2011) straightforwardly calls for changing the typical 
design perspective, which only considers the moral values associated with pro-
fessional ethics, in order for engineers to make self-conscious, deliberate choices 
about the broader and deeper moral values that get embedded within technologies. 
He claims that because “technologies inevitably play a mediating role in the ac-
tions of users . . . designing should be regarded as a form of materializing morality.”
To improve upon the status quo, Verbeek contends that designers should carry 
out “mediation analyses” (availing themselves of various of methods, ranging from 
introspection to “an augmented form of constructive technology assessment”) that 
registers values and concerns expressed by representative stakeholders. Filtering 
this recommendation through Plato’s bivalent statement of his “philosopher king” 
ideal—either that philosophers become kings or that kings should adequately phi-
losophize—society might be better off not only with technology designers who 
adequately philosophize, but also with philosophers of technology who meaning-
fully contribute to design.
Further justification for public engagement can be inferred from the writings 
of technology critic Evgeny Morozov. In a series of popular articles, Morozov 
analyzes the adverse ethical and political consequences that arise when society 
uncritically embraces Silicon Valley ideology. While there are explicit parallels 
between these problems and ones identified canonical philosophy of technology 
research, the fact remains that Morozov identifies a new target of concern—a 
problem that only recently emerged. Had Morozov waited to identify this problem 
in a peer-reviewed article that took considerable time to be published, neither the 
general public nor scholars would be put on early notice. Consequently, consumer 
habits would be more deeply entrenched and scholars would lack valuable point-
ers on where to look for contemporary technological threats to ethical-judgment 
and political accountability.
Ultimately, Morozov (2013) expressed his guiding ideas in book form. 
Thanks, in part, to his previous popular writing, he already cultivated a large 
audience eager to consider and assess his theses. Consequently, immense pub-
lic discussion—both accolades and criticism—have been taking place over his 
interpretation of how technology is used and theorized. This discussion has cut 
across disciplinary boundaries. Arguably, it has reinvigorated widespread interest 
in fundamental philosophy of technology concerns.
In sum, some of the theoretical motivations outlined above call for our in-
tervention in public dialogue. Others require greater intervention into design and 
policy debate. In both cases, the following questions become inescapable: Who 
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should bring these changes about, if not those of us whose work shows the impor-
tance of these changes occurring? In our absence, who will take up these reins, 
instead, and what responsibility do we have for that outcome?
And yet those of us who do theoretical NEST research are not practically and 
professionally encouraged to take up this interventionist work. Scholarship in tra-
ditional academic venues is insufficiently publically available, generally read, or 
speedily published to support timely and to-the-minute commentary. Furthermore, 
academic performance assessment typically either fails to incentivize or specifi-
cally disincentivizes publication in non-traditional academic venues.
If we are effectively to meet the need for scholarly intervention in non-
academic dialogue on NEST, new or reformed incentive structures must be put 
in place to encourage writing that is: (1) sufficiently agile and efficient to allow 
publication on issues in NEST, while those issues are still active and in motion; 
and (2) sufficiently accessible and far-reaching to make a meaningful contribution 
to public dialogue on NEST, while relevant issues are still active and in motion.
To correct the situation, therefore, two steps must be taken: incentive struc-
tures must be changed in order to further validate public philosophy within the 
field, and disciplinary training and culture must be changed to provide emerging 
scholars with familiarity and experience with the means and processes of doing 
public philosophy.
Revising Incentive Structures
Before articulating proposals that are specific to philosophers of technology, it will 
be helpful to establish further institutional context and identify some of the central 
mechanisms favored in broader attempts to revise incentive structures to better 
support and reward publicly engaged scholarly activity.
There is a historical and general consensus that colleges and universities exist 
in part to contribute to our communities and to educate and serve the public. Ernest 
Boyer (1990) started a conversation in Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the 
Professoriate, published by the Carnegie Foundation, pertaining to how scholar-
ship is defined and rewarded in academic institutions of today. Boyer argues that 
four areas should be included in the definition of scholarship: discovery, teaching, 
application (or engagement) and integration. Since the Boyer publication, many 
organizations, institutions and scholars have studied and discussed this ongoing 
issue. Kezar, Chambers, and Burkhardt (2005) believe that public purpose of in-
stitutions of higher education is being thrown by the wayside as other goals such 
as increasing revenue and individual benefits take priority. Faculty members, con-
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cerned with productivity expectations and tenure and promotion requirements, and 
seek out practical ways to measure contributions to the community (Franz 2009).
Kelly Ward (2005) indicates that there are three categories to describe faculty 
work: teaching, research, and service. At most colleges and universities these three 
categories are outlined somewhere in tenure and promotion guidelines. While some 
institutions value research over teaching and vice versa, as Ward states, “service, 
even clearly academic, institutional service, has traditionally been the underap-
preciated stepchild of the triumvirate of academic work” (Ward 2005: 219). Ward 
mentions consulting, both paid and unpaid, as one type of service to the commu-
nity that is directly related to a faculty member’s subject expertise that is usually 
not acknowledged as part of the tenure and promotion process. Committee work 
within institutions or as a subject expert in the community are other examples of 
service work that is usually expected but not rewarded. “Campuses that want their 
faculty to work in connection to the community must define in their promotion 
and tenure guidelines and faculty handbooks what this work looks like, and how it 
will be evaluated and rewarded” (Ward 2005: 229). If service to the community is 
not supported or rewarded by academic institutions, faculty members will be less 
likely to engage in such activities.
Recently, quantitative studies have been conducted and some universities 
have begun to implement measures that will recognize scholarly activities such 
as service learning, participation in mass media, and instruction during the tenure 
and promotion process. Glass, Doberneck, and Schweitzer (2011) investigated the 
tenure and promotion files, personal narratives and curriculum vitae of faculty at 
Michigan State University to determine the types of publicly engaged scholarship 
faculty members reported. They discovered three categories in which 72 percent 
of faculty members reported publicly engaged research and other creative activi-
ties: instruction, service, and commercialized activities. Types of publicly engaged 
scholarship were found to vary by personal characteristics such as age, gender, 
ethnicity, years at the institution, and rank as well as professional characteristics 
such as field of study. Glass, Doberneck, and Schweitzer recommend that institu-
tions that support publicly engaged scholarship should consider these variances 
when creating policies, guidelines, and support allocations.
Saltmarsh, Giles, Ward, and Buglione (2009) conducted a qualitative study 
that examined data from universities that were identified in 2006 by the Carnegie 
Institute as community-engaged campuses. By reviewing documents including 
faculty and tenure guidelines, faculty handbooks, and interviews, they determined 
that almost half of the thirty-three campuses studied were in the process of revis-
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ing tenure and promotion guidelines to recognize community engagement as a 
scholarly activity. “Regardless of the unique institutional culture that shapes the 
framework of engagement on a campus, clear policy formulation rewarding the 
scholarship of community engagement corresponds with concrete definition of 
scholarly engagement” (Saltmarsh, Giles, Ward, and Buglione 2009: 31). Based 
on their findings, Saltmarsh et al. identify three areas of focus for universities that 
desire to encourage community engaged scholarship: to create specific criteria for 
evidence of demonstration, to “create policies that reward community engage-
ment across faculty roles so that research activity will be integrated with teaching 
and service as seamlessly connected scholarly activity” (Saltmarsh et al. 2009: 
32), and to redefine “what is considered as a “publication” and who constitutes a 
“peer” in the peer review process” (Saltmarsh et al. 2009: 32).
In 1998, faculty members and administrators from the Pennsylvania State 
University came together to discuss the recognition and documentation of out-
reach scholarship in the university (Hyman et al. 2001–02). The outcome of this 
group’s work was UniSCOPE (University Scholarship and Criteria for Outreach 
and Performance Evaluation). UniSCPOPE identifies three forms of scholarship: 
teaching, research and service, and recognizes them equally. The model also in-
corporates the four functions of scholarship identified in the Boyer (1990) report: 
discovery, integration, application and education. In addition to traditionally 
recognized contributions, UniSCOPE also places value on activities such as “the 
creation of applications in the field, active presentation of original works, utiliza-
tion in practice settings, impacts in public policy, appearance of results in the 
media, seminars and workshops, electronic publication, technical assistance, and 
technology transfer” (Hyman et al. 2001–02: 45). According to their guidelines, 
scholarship in many forms can be assessed and rewarded.
Graeme Orr (2010) focuses on academics’ participation in the media in 
Australia. He outlines three ways in which an academic can participate in media 
engagement: as a public intellectual (a generalist), as an advocate or activist, or as 
an educator offering an expertise in a specific discipline. Philosophers tend to fall 
into the public intellectual category, which is defined as “someone who can move 
easily between topics, drawing on a variety of philosophical positions or con-
textual understandings” (Orr 2010: 23). However, a philosopher with a relevant 
subject expertise could easily participate in media engagements as an advocate 
or educator as well. Orr points out that an important role of a university is not 
only to create scholarship, but to expand the knowledge of communities outside 
of universities. Through participation in mass media, scholars can contribute to 
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the process of engaging and educating communities. Orr also addresses the issue 
of “mediaphobia,” or the fear of academics that their expertise may be dumbed 
down or distorted during the editing process. This is a legitimate concern. It is 
important for academics to be selective in their agreements to participate in mass 
media engagements.
These changes and conversations provide a good basis upon which we may 
advocate, in our own institutions, for reformation of incentive structures. Service-
learning is increasingly accepted as academic work worthy of receiving course 
credit for our students, and concomitantly as activity appropriate for us, as faculty, 
to coordinate and assess. From here it is a very short leap to claim that such activ-
ity should be valued when engaged in by faculty outside of a classroom setting—
in other words, that public engagement and activism within a faculty member’s 
area of expertise should be regarded as legitimate scholarly activity that should be 
appropriately recognized. Boyer (1990), as adapted in Saltmarsh et al. (2009) and 
in Hyman et al. (2001–02) gives us the useful category of “scholarship of applica-
tion,” parallel to scholarship of teaching. Just as scholarship of teaching—includ-
ing not only journal articles on subject-relevant pedagogy, but the development 
of teaching resources and software—is increasingly widely accepted as falling 
under “research” rather than “teaching” or “service,” so too we may advocate for 
the scholarship of application to be placed under the honorific aegis of “research” 
insofar as we are not merely consulting with industry or speaking to the press, but 
pursuing goals central to and grounded within our theoretical perspectives and 
research programs.
While we are hopeful that these conversations may result in broader changes 
in recognition of public scholarly activity, they have obviously been slow in com-
ing, and most academics remain in the position described by Ward (2005), in which 
public engagement falls into the “unappreciated stepchild” category of service, if 
promotion and tenure guidelines provide any sort of recognition for this work at 
all. We are, however, by no means forced simply to wait for the university climate 
to change its disrespect of public engagement, nor are we able to enact change 
only through advocating for reformation of incentive structures in promotion and 
tenure separately within our individual institutions. While we believe these wider 
programs for change are worthwhile and should be pursued, we can also engage 
in reforms within our own disciplinary structures in order to support and reward 
public engagement better, even for those whose institutions count peer-reviewed 
scholarly publication as the only legitimate entry within the “research” column.
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Peer-reviewed Public Philosophy
One possible way of changing incentive structures is to provide validation of pub-
lic philosophy through a change in the kind of work given access to traditional and 
respected venues for scholarly publication. Established scholarly journals could 
create a new category of publication: “Articles for a General Audience,” perhaps, 
or “Public Philosophy.” By publishing post-publication reprints of Public Philoso-
phy, following peer-review, academic journals could send a message to promo-
tion and tenure committees that this kind of work is considered to be legitimate 
scholarly research activity within our field. The peer-review standards would have 
to be uniquely appropriate to publication for a general audience, and therefore 
presumably of a lower expectation of completeness and rigor than that expected 
of a purely scholarly audience, and perhaps including other criteria absent from 
expectations for traditional academic articles. While institutional promotion and 
tenure committees would have to work out their own weighting of such publica-
tions, the value of such scholarship might appropriately be considered less than 
that of a traditional scholarly article, but more than that of e.g., a book review, and 
could be placed between these established sections by journals as an indication of 
their relative scholarly value. Regardless of the particular assessments within vari-
ous institutions, a significant change in incentive structures would result simply 
from the attachment of such work to academic journals, and from the guarantee of 
quality provided by the peer-review process.
In January 2013, D. E. Wittkower and Evan Selinger coauthored a letter to the 
editors of Techné, requesting that the journal, as an organ of the Society for Phi-
losophy of Technology, consider creating such a category of publication in order 
to better serve the public goals of our field and to better support members of the 
society engaged in public philosophy of technology. Additional signatories on the 
letter were Braden Allenby, Ian Bogost, Albert Borgmann, Adam Briggle, Charles 
Ess, David Goldberg, J. Britt Holbrook, Don Ihde, David Kaplan, Patrick Lin, 
Clark Miller, Søren Riis, Daniel Sarewitz, Shannon Vallor, and Peter-Paul Verbeek.
The proposal has been well received. However, discussion of implementation 
has been delayed. Editor-in-Chief Joseph Pitt is stepping down, and the editors of 
Techné decided that it is best to begin discussion of implementation once a new 
editor-in-chief is in place.
We hope that this model would be applicable to other journals in the dis-
cipline. While the editors of Techné have been appealed to in part on the basis 
of provincial concerns—the status of the journal as the organ of the society and 
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
the specific valuation of public philosophy within philosophy of technology—the 
model is easily portable to other journals, including those within other areas of 
philosophy. We hope that, should this model be successful, other areas of phi-
losophy which have their own internal and theoretically-motivated incentives for 
public engagement may be next to adopt a similar model. This would clearly apply 
to computer ethics, biomedical ethics, and business ethics.
And yet, as outlined in the introduction to this article, there are numerous 
ways in which branches of philosophy with less of a theoretical motivation for 
public philosophy are also absent within American public dialogue on issues of 
philosophical concern. Were this model to prove valuable within these more ap-
plied subfields, it is possible that wider adoption could assist other philosophers 
in becoming both better supported and better incentivized in engaging in public 
dialogue on issues such as scientific method, ethics and public values, economic 
development, distributive justice, and meaning and purpose in life.
Public Peer-reviewed Philosophy
Another possible avenue of change is placing an increased weight on ideals of 
open access and public outreach within traditional research publications. Here, 
rather than incentivizing and supporting publications for a non-scholarly audience 
by providing a post facto valorization through subsequent peer-review and repub-
lication, the structures and processes of peer-reviewed journal publication would 
be changed in order to allow them a potentially expanded role in non-scholarly 
discourse and debate. Open access (henceforth, OA) is a necessary but not a suf-
ficient condition for this potential to be a realistic one. Additional efforts would 
have to be made to bring non-philosophers to the virtual pages of OA journals 
through back-links from other more popular presentations published in prominent 
blogs or mass media outlets.
True OA peer-reviewed options—that is, journals which post all material im-
mediately on the open web with no author fees—are available for those publishing 
in philosophy of technology, including the International Review of Information 
Ethics and the Journal of Evolution and Technology. There are also numerous in-
terdisciplinary true OA options which would be good venues for work in philoso-
phy of technology, including First Monday, Fast Capitalism, Digital Culture and 
Education, The Fibreculture Journal, Ctrl-Z, Digital Studies/Le champ numérique, 
NmediaC, Media Tropes, The Journal of Community Informatics, Cyberpsychol-
ogy: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace, tripleC: Communication, 
Capitalism & Critique, Online Journal of Communication and Media Technolo-
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gies, Kairos: A Journal of Rhetoric, Technology, and Pedagogy, MedieKultur, M/C 
Journal, the International Journal of Internet Science, Human Technology, and 
Digital Humanities Quarterly.
Techné currently allows free posting of pre-publication drafts. While this is 
a praiseworthy compromise, it does not address publicity concerns as well as true 
OA publication. Not all authors will take advantage of the possibility, and not all 
readers will be aware that articles may be available in OA format, or may have 
difficulty finding OA versions even when authors do choose to post them. Green 
OA has similar limitations, along with further diminished value from the six-
month embargo usually observed on pre-publication Green OA drafts. Gold OA 
structures are very undesirable, as the fees demanded—for example, about $3000 
USD to publish an article in OA format with Philosophy & Technology, Ethics 
and Information Technology, the Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 
or Contunuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies—are high, and institutional 
funding for OA fees are rarely available to humanities and social science scholars.
There are several possible ways of improving the situation of OA within 
our field:
1. We may push Techné, whose policies are already permissive and which 
has a particular concern for our community as an organ of the Society for 
Philosophy and Technology, to move to a true OA format.
2. Senior faculty, less beholden to traditional incentive structures, could 
organize a publication boycott of journals without true OA publication, 
producing a shift in which journals are best known and respected within 
the field.
3. Professional societies, such as the Society for Philosophy and Tech-
nology, might endorse and publish an open letter on the value of OA 
publication. This could be used by faculty members in the attempt to 
secure funding for Gold OA fees, and could be included in promotion 
and tenure files in order to explain why sometimes lesser-known true OA 
journals were chosen as venues for publication. If sufficiently strongly 
worded, this could help remove disincentives to true OA publication for 
junior faculty.
4. Similar statements supporting faculty choosing true OA publication 
could be pursued through other associations of broader scope and rep-
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resentation, such as the APA Committee on Computers and Philosophy 
and the AAUP (American Association of University Professors).
Any and all of these efforts would be valuable and effective. What is currently 
lacking is not so much a lack of opportunity for change as a lack of collective will 
and solidarity. Many scholars are deeply concerned with maximizing access to 
their work, but neither class-consciousness nor the will to collective action has 
emerged. Instead, scholars are left to struggle with negotiating in isolation the 
terrains of incentive and assessment local to their own home institutions.
Publicizing Peer-reviewed Philosophy
The attempt to increase traffic to philosophical research, for which true OA pub-
lication represents a significant benefit, would provide no direct incentive to en-
gaging in public philosophy (unlike what we might prematurely call “the Techné 
model,” outlined in the “Peer-Reviewed Public Philosophy” section above). In-
stead, it only makes better and more direct use of peer-reviewed publications that 
are already valued as a professional activity. This outcome has both advantages 
and disadvantages.
One advantage is that work that is not written for a general audience (and 
which may in fact be written by authors who do not value public engagement at 
all) can still be mobilized in order to influence public debate and positively impact 
the public perception of the field. A notable disadvantage is that the approach 
may not help open up the isolated, insider-only culture that’s widespread within 
academic philosophy. As we’ve been arguing, this culture needs to change, as it 
remains an ongoing source of our professional marginalization.
In addition to this concern about a lack of engagement with disciplinary cul-
tures of self-isolation, there are concerns with the applicability of traditional aca-
demic research to public dialogue. Unlike the Techné model, this avenue of change 
is not ideally suited to promote engagement in debates about NEST. Indeed, the 
slow peer-review process reduces the agility, celerity, and relevance of scholarly 
intervention in public dialogue.
Fortunately, these approaches are not mutually exclusive. Both may be pur-
sued simultaneously.
Additionally, although traffic to scholarly philosophy might be enabled or en-
couraged, this may do little good if the norms of peer-reviewed scholarly writing 
continue to tolerate or encourage obscurantist presentation of material. A potential 
way to overcome this problem is to modify the practice—especially common in 
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the European context, which is driven by a legislated culture of academic im-
pact assessment—for journals to put out press releases. Those documents enable 
journalists and other non-specialists easier access to the results of peer-reviewed 
academic research, much of which is at least as impenetrable to the non-specialist 
as is academic philosophical research.
A quick review of press releases from the Taylor & Francis Group that are 
currently online shows a strong emphasis on biology, medicine, environmental 
science, and social sciences (Taylor & Francis Group 2013a). By contrast, there’s 
not a single press release is from a philosophy journal. Remarkably, though, the 
way in which some articles are pitched to journalists emphasizes elements that are 
at least as well represented by articles appearing in philosophy journals.
For example, the press release for an article in the International Journal of 
Psychology entitled “Of Course the Tooth Fairy’s Real: How Parents Lie in the 
US and China” does not emphasize cross-cultural issues or insights specific to 
the field of psychology. Instead, it offers a take-away message for journalists that 
is more proper to discussions emerging from virtue ethics: “Above all this study 
shows the need to stimulate debate about the acceptability of lying under different 
circumstances, and how children should be best raised to understand the value of 
honesty” (Taylor & Francis Group 2013b). We thus might ask why it is that Taylor 
& Francis—recognizing a desire on the part of journalists to access journal articles 
that might help them “stimulate debate” about “the acceptability of lying under dif-
ferent circumstances”—does not more frequently point to philosophical writing.
We might also wonder why philosophical writing is not being promoted actu-
ally to structure and inform debate—roles which philosophical writing is uniquely 
positioned to play. Perhaps this bias in what is promoted is part and parcel of the 
perception of the lack of public interest in philosophy. Or, perhaps it does not 
occur to those in charge of public relations that the public might be interested 
in what is being said in philosophy journals. Maybe these public relations staff 
members themselves share the public lack of awareness that philosophy has much 
to offer to public debate. Quite possibly, the issue is more structural and economic 
than cultural. It may be that journalists are more likely to make use of social sci-
ence articles, and that this, in turn, makes them more important to journal groups 
to promote. Hence, there’s a possible feedback loop that increasingly marginalizes 
excluded fields. No matter the reason, though, it is clear that a partial solution to 
the perceived irrelevance of philosophy to public debate would be to attempt to 
have publicly relevant philosophical research presented to the public through press 
releases in a similar proportion as is academic research within other fields.
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Changing Our Culture of Disengagement
Even in the absence of these connections between traditional, academically vali-
dated scholarship and public philosophy, and in the absence of familiarity with 
and experience in public engagement as a normal and significant element of dis-
ciplinary training and culture, numerous philosophers of technology have been 
successful in reaching wider audiences. Philosophers of technology including 
Fritz Allhoff (e.g., 2007, 2012), Ian Bogost (e.g., 2012, 2013), Adam Briggle (e.g., 
2010, 2012), Luciano Floridi (2011), Patrick Lin (e.g., 2009, 2013), Daniel Sare-
witz (e.g., 2010, Sarewitz and Pielke 2013), Evan Selinger (e.g., 2012a, 2012b, 
2013), George Teschner (e.g., 2009, 2011), and D. E. Wittkower (e.g., 2010, 
2011, 2013) have given presentations and published articles, chapters, and books 
for a general audience with outlets including The Atlantic, The Australian, Slate 
Magazine, Speakeasy, TED Talks, Three Quarks Daily, Wired, and the Open Court 
and Wiley-Blackwell series on Popular Culture and Philosophy. Given increased 
validation and valorization of public philosophy within the field, we can expect 
that further pathways to public philosophy will be built and existing pathways will 
be strengthened, and that, along with this, disciplinary training and culture may 
change so that emerging scholars will be more familiar with and better supported 
in doing public philosophy.
Through these means, we can advance the public agenda of our specializa-
tion, supporting philosophers of technology who take such public involvement 
as a proper part of their scholarly mission, and helping to reclaim philosophy’s 
proper place in our culture and society. As Nigel Warburton said recently in an 
interview with The Philosopher’s Magazine,
Philosophers today have mostly got their heads down. They’re concerned 
with writing for a journal which will publish work that takes them two or 
three years, and only five people will read it. These are people who could 
be contributing to something that’s incredibly important. Gay marriage is 
just one example of many. I don’t think philosophers responded particu-
larly well to 9/11. Issues about free expression, all over the world, are not 
just academic. They’re matters of life and death. There are exceptions, but 
philosophers are by and large more interested in getting a paper in Mind or 
Analysis than they are in commenting on the major political events of our 
time. (The Philosopher’s Magazine 2013)
It is our belief that this attitude is one which has been learned—that it emerges from 
our disciplinary culture, training, and incentive structures—and that once we change 
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incentive structures to support public philosophy adequately, our practices, habits, 
and ultimately even our training will change. Can it really be that philosophers are 
happy and fulfilled as voices in the wilderness, and do not desire to come down from 
the mountain to speak among the people? Are we really not the mouth for these ears?
Note
1. Lorna Roth (2009) notes that Gold Max, a “leap forward” in accurate repre-
sentation of non-white skin tone, was “referred to initially as being as able ‘to pho-
tograph the details of a dark horse in low light’” which she “[takes] to be a coded 
message, informing the public that this is ‘the right film for photographing ‘peoples of 
colour.’” As Roth also notes, it is also around this time, in 1995, that Kodak produced 
its first multiracial norm reference card for photograph processing labs to use in prop-
erly color-balancing photographs of non-whites.
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